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CASE NOTES
with the result that decisions, such as the present one, will henceforth be
above reproach.
PETER N. WELLS
Fair. Trade—McGuire Act—Absolute Prohibition of Resale Price Main-
tenance Agreements between Competitors.—Texas Co. v. DiGaetano. 1—
A bill in equity was brought by the Texas Company against a gasoline
retailer to enjoin the latter from selling Texaco gasoline for less than the
minimum prices established by a resale price maintenance agreement which
was entered into between the company and another of its retailers. 2 The
defendant, though not a party to this agreement, was obligated to comply
with the resale prices agreed upon, once he learned of the agreement, by
virtue of the "non-signer" provisions of the New Jersey Fair Trade statute. 3
The defendant appealed from an order denying his motion to vacate a final
judgment enjoining his "price-cutting" and the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded the decree of the ,
lower court. HELD: The plaintiff oil company could not compete with the
defendant retailer for business of a type exempted from the plaintiff's price-
resale schedule and at the same time enforce fair trade prices against the
retailer in a non-exempted field.
It is by virtue of the Miller-Tydings amendment of the Sherman Act 4
that state-authorized fair trading of goods moving in interstate commerce
is lawful, and the application of such price-maintenance agreements to "non-
signers" is permitted by the McGuire amendment of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.3 Both of these permissive amendments provide that agree-
ments between "corporations in competition with each other" are expressly
prohibited. The defendant in the instant case contended that since he and
the plaintiff were "in - competition with each other" for commercial and
industrial accounts, it would be unlawful to allow the plaintiff to hold him
to fair trade restrictions on price with respect to sales to privately owned
automobiles.
Plaintiff oil company, perhaps with an eye to the competition provisions
of these amendments, had promulgated a New Jersey fair trade price sched-
ule exempting from fair trade prices "sales made by retailer to ... commer-
cial or industrial concerns or institutional establishments." The schedule
stated that the "primary purpose" of the exemption was to enable the
Texaco retailers to meet the competition of retailers of other brands selling
at lower prices to buses, trucks, tractors and other commercial vehicles.
1 71 N.J. 413, 177 A.2d 273 (1961).
2 The suit was instituted pursuant to the New Jersey Fair Trade Statute. N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 56:4-5 (1940).
3 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:4-6 (1940). This statute has been sustained as not violative
of due process. See Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304
(1954).
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
5 The Miller-Tydings Act did not have a non-signer provision. The Supreme Court
in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), had held that
the resale price agreements could not be enforced against non-contracting parties.
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Retail sales to individually owned pleasure vehicles remained subject to the
specified minimum retail price.
The defendant retailer argued that, by this schedule, the plaintiff had
recognized that its retail dealers were doing commercial consumer business
from their stations. This, together with evidence tending to show the plaintiff
had actively solicited some of the same accounts, was sufficient to establish
the "deliberate and substantial activity" needed to bring the case within the
rule laid down in Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc.°
In that case, as in this, a gasoline producer sought to compel com-
pliance with state-authorized fair trade price restrictions to which the.
dealer was not a signatory. The plaintiff in Secatore, admitting he serviced
several hundred "commercial accounts," nevertheless felt he was entitled
to injunctive relief so as to impose fair trade price restrictions on the class
of business for which they did not compete: retail sales to private passenger
vehicles. The Secatore court refused to accept this argument because of
the strict interpretation of the l\Iiller-Tydings and McGuire amendments
by United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc. 7
The last named case involved a drug manufacturer who in addition to
selling its own line of products to wholesalers also acted as wholesaler of its
own products and those of other manufacturers by making direct sales to
retailers. Resale price maintenance agreements were entered into between
the manufacturers and the independent wholesalers. The Court held that
such agreements between the manufacturer-wholesaler and other independent
wholesalers were illegal under the Sherman Act because the McGuire Act
immunity explicitly disallows agreements "between wholesalers . . . in
competition with each other."8 McKesson contended that when they entered
into these contracts they did so as a manufacturer. The Court was un-
impressed stating that resale price maintenance is a "privilege restrictive
of a free economy," and accepted the Government's position that since
McKesson competed with the independent wholesalers with respect to the
wholesale end of their business they would not be allowed to enforce their
resale price maintenance agreements. The Court stated that "the crucial
inquiry is whether or not the contracting parties compete with each other."
The particular label attached to the activity is of no moment.
The instant case states, as did McKesson and Seca tore, that to fall
within the protection of the McGuire amendment the contracting parties
must scrupulously adhere to the prohibition of resale price agreements
between competitors. The Texas Company attempted to get around this
requirement by promulgating separate schedules and failed.
It is submitted that the decision is sound. Since the legislative history
of the McGuire amendment did not indicate that any amount of compe-
tition between the contracting parties would be tolerated, 1 ° the New Jersey
246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834.
T 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
8 Id. at 316.
9 Id. at 313. See also Herman, Fair Trade and McKesson & Robbins, 44 Calif. L.
Rev. 853 (1956).
10 Supra note 6.
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court sensibly took the position that since the prohibition was phrased in
the absolute, it meant exactly that. Any other decision would have led to a
merry-go-round discussion of how much competition is too much.
CARL E. RUBINSTEIN
Labor Law—Agency Shop Agreements—Invalid under NLRA.—Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. NLRB.1—General Motors had included in its national
agreement with the United Auto Workers Union maintenance-of-membership
and union shop provisions applicable where these arrangements would not
contravene state law. Shortly after an Indiana decision upholding the validity
of the agency shop under the law of that state, 2 the union requested that
General Motors bargain with respect to adding such a provision to the
national agreement to cover the company's plants within Indiana. The com-
pany refused to bargain alleging that such an agreement would violate the
National Labor Relations Act. 3
 The union' filed a charge with the NLRB
1
 45 C.C.H. Lab, L. Rep. Q 17,655 (6 Cir. 1962).
2
 Meade Electric Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959), noted
3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 91 (1961). The court decided that the state Right-To-
Work Law prohibited only the union shop. Unlike some of these statutes, which also
prohibit the payment of fees and dues, the Indiana law reads:
No corporation or individual or association or labor organization shall solicit,
enter into or extend any contract, agreement or understanding, written or oral,
to exclude from employment any person by reason of membership or non-
membership in a labor organization, to discharge or suspend from employment
or lay off any person by reason of his refusal to join a labor organization.. , .
Any such contract, agreement, or understanding, written or oral, entered into
or extended after the effective date of this Act, shall be null and void and of
no force or effect. (Emphasis added.)
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 40-2703 (Supp. 1959).
3 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). The statute reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3). (Emphasis added.)
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3) (1958), as amended 29 U.S.C.
158(3)(i) (1959) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—.
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7;
*	 *	 *	 *
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of
the United States shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization . . . to require as'a condition of employment membership
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment
or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later . . . . Provided
further, that no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same
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